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Abstract: Most analyses of modern capitalism focus on bargains struck between workers, 
managers, and owners (and the different types of firms they inhabit). But considering the 
substantial influence of institutional inertia on modern outcomes, it is necessary to 
examine the origins, and to consider which actors were most important in the early 
construction of capitalist systems. In this regard, farmers have played a critical role. I 
examine four cases - early 19th Century United States, early 20th Century United States, 
post-WWII France, and post-WWII Japan - to assess farmers’ influence on the origins of 
contemporary institutions, and find that they have played an important, though frequently 
overlooked, role.
*S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore.
2I) Introduction
Among wealthy democracies, industrialization during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries altered the existing agrarian-based economy and created a new, 
‘modern’ form of capitalism. While most analyses of modern capitalism focus on 
workers, managers, and owners, these studies frequently overlook the origins of its
institutions. Considering the substantial influence of institutional inertia on modern 
outcomes, it is necessary to examine the origins, and to consider which actors were most 
important at that time. In this regard, farmers have played a critical role. Although they 
may lack the power to exert changes to the institutions of contemporary capitalism in 
today’s wealthy economies, their influence is felt most strongly through the legacy of the 
institutions they were instrumental in creating, and by retaining the power to block 
changes to it. By shaping the origins of capitalist institutions, the effects of farmers on 
contemporary capitalism are substantial, though frequently overlooked.
Indeed, an enlightening and novel understanding of modern capitalist outcomes 
emerges by considering the political power-sharing coalitions that farmers have formed 
with labor (as in post-WWII France), capital (as in the twentieth century US), and with 
labor and capital (as in post-WWII Japan). For example, in France following World War 
II, farmers offered political support for the increased level of government intervention in 
the economy, and helped to create and support the expansion of what was to become one 
of the world’s largest banks – the Crédit Agricole. In the US, farmers’ political influence 
led to strong regulations protecting local banks and, through the US’s decentralized 
political system, they contributed to the fragmentation of the American financial system. 
In Japan, farmers supported the postal savings bank, which became even larger than the
3Crédit Agricole, and which fed large amounts of money to the government which was 
then lent to industry (through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program) and thereby 
helped to foster a long-term financing orientation among Japanese firms. 
In section two, I discuss farmers’ preferences over the structure of key economic 
institutions with implications for the broader political economy. Section three examines 
four cases to illustrate how farmers have been important to the structure of capitalist 
economies: nineteenth and twentieth century United States, post-WWII France, and post-
WWII Japan. Section four concludes.
II) What Farmers Want
Hall and Soskice (2001) identify key attributes that distinguish capitalist economies from 
one another. Drawing on the work of Oliver Williamson (1975), they point to asset 
specificity as a critical attribute that differentiates Coordinated Market Economics 
(CMEs) from Liberal Market Economies (LMEs). Where assets are specific to the goods 
and services that are produced, relationships tend to dominate the manner in which actors 
organize their economic activity, as in CMEs. Where assets are more general -- that is, 
they can more easily be switched from producing one kind of good or service to another -
- arms-length interactions predominate, as in LMEs. For example, with a greater reliance 
on general assets, and arm’s-length interactions, securities markets tend to be more 
important; LMEs tend to have a higher market capitalization than CMEs (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001: 19). However, Hall and Soskice acknowledge that several countries do not 
fit neatly onto their LME-CME continuum. They place these political economies into a 
third category: Mixed (or Mediterranean) Capitalism. They are distinguished by their 
4recent histories of extensive state intervention and large agrarian sectors, as in Italy, 
France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 21). Thus, taken 
together, Hall and Soskice identify three key attributes that distinguish capitalist systems 
from one another: asset specificity, the level of government intervention, and the 
importance of the agrarian sector. It is obvious that farmers would favor a large 
agricultural sector, so I will focus on their less obvious, but more consequential, impact 
on asset specificity and government intervention. 
With regard to asset specificity, farmers prefer an economy with a greater 
emphasis on specific assets; in other words, a relationship-based economy. Long-term 
economic arrangements are important to them for coping with uncertain crop yields from 
one season to the next. Farmers, across most countries during the twentieth century, are 
generally too small to seek financing from capital markets, and must rely on local banks, 
either in the form of branches of large, networked banks, or in the form of unit banks 
(i.e., small, local banks without ties to a larger, national banking network). This 
relationship to the local bank, or agricultural credit bureau, is critical to their survival and 
success. Keeping capital location-specific with regulations protecting and supporting 
local banks ensures that lenders will not go elsewhere at the expense of local farms. 
Moreover, keeping banks location-specific ties the bank’s fortunes to those of local 
farmers; local banks will have to continue lending to local farmers despite a long-term 
negative revision in expectations regarding the profitability of investment (e.g., an 
expected long-term decline in the terms of trade). This preserves a long-term relationship 
between the local bank and farmers, and offers a kind of ‘loan insurance’ in the sense that 
farmers can rest assured that banks will continue to loan to them even in bad times 
5(Calomiris, 2000). For this reason, farmers may favor unit banks since they are tied to the 
local economy, as compared with the branch of a larger national bank, which can send 
funds to ‘greener pastures’. To compensate for the risk of bank failure as a result of 
underperforming, or nonperforming, loans (an acute risk for unit banks), deposit 
insurance may be created. 
As a consequence of farmers favoring local agricultural banking arrangements, 
the growth of securities markets will be stunted. And where farmers have more political 
power and there exists a more equitable distribution of wealth, ownership of large 
corporations is less likely to be concentrated and controlled by a small group of families 
or institutions (e.g., populist resistance to capitalist oligarchs in the late 19th century U.S.; 
Chandler, 1977: 498; Roe, 1994). Instead, ownership, corresponding to general wealth 
and banking outcomes, will tend to be more dispersed. 
Farmers also tend to favor government intervention in order to divert money away 
from industrializing sectors (or other areas of the economy where a higher return is 
likely). And when farmers wield political power, they can direct funds collected through 
banks or taxes to favored programs (e.g., subsidizing agrarian financing and rural 
construction projects). As a result of their preference for government intervention via 
banks, farmers can foster a bias towards patient capital for corporate finance, and stunt 
the development of equities markets. For example, in Japan, farmers were important to 
the success of the postal savings system - the main source of funds for the government’s 
interventionist activities - which enabled subsidized lending to many large corporations.
Government ownership of banks in France following WWII likewise led to patient 
corporate financing, and to the swelling of agricultural assistance. Together, farmers’ 
6preference for relationships to a local bank and for government intervention generates 
pressure for the existence of a coordinated market economy.
III) Cases
Early economic systems were centered around agriculture. From this starting point, they 
have evolved into modern economies with farmers forging political coalitions with 
capital and/or labor, or being denied influence altogether in some circumstances. Here, I 
focus on those cases where farmers have influenced the structure of the political economy 
either alone or in combination with other actors. In the early nineteenth century United 
States, farmers’ wielded a near monopoly over politics, which led to an agrarian style of 
coordinated market economy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, farmers 
were forced to compromise on changes to the existing economic rules and institutions as 
they fought to rein in the growing influence of capital. In post-WWII France, farmers 
shared power with labor, which led to the formation of a Mediterranean form of 
capitalism. And in post-WWII Japan, farmers bargained with both labor and capital to 
create a capitalist system that resembled France (a labor-farmer outcome) with regard to 
its interventionist government, Germany (a labor-capital outcome) with regard to its 
industrial relations, and the United States (a farmer-capital outcome) with regard to 
managers wielding substantial power over the corporation (as opposed to owners). I 
discuss these cases in turn.
Farmers Dominate: Early 19th Century United States
7The early US financial system is a nearly unique example of what happens when farmers 
control policymaking in a democracy. In most countries, farmers’ political influence has 
been heavily muted by the arrangement of the political institutions. In few instances have 
farmers dominated policymaking as much as they did in the early 19th century US. 
The federal government’s institutional structure led to the devolution of 
regulatory authority to the state level with regard to banking. This dominance of local 
interests – farmers - was preserved by Congress in three ways. First, elected officials to 
the House of Representatives depend on the support of local groups in their home 
constituency for reelection, comprised largely of farming interests during the early 
nineteenth century. Consequently, members would support legislation that assisted local 
farmers, including the preservation and strengthening of local banking facilities, placing 
the regulatory authority of them at the local level, and defeating efforts that could erode 
this financial structure (e.g., interstate bank branching). 
Second, the Senate helped to preserve farmers’ power by granting every state the 
same number of senators. This would later lead to considerable malapportionment in 
favor of rural states, which would give agricultural interests sufficient political power to 
block changes to the banking system, and help to preserve the status quo as constructed in 
the nineteenth century.
The third way in which Congress helped to keep banking regulations set at the 
local level was by its influence over Supreme Court nominees who were frequently 
selected for their support of states’ rights. As a result of this emphasis, the Supreme Court 
did not extend constitutional protection to banking as an activity involving interstate 
commerce, thereby opening the way to state regulatory prohibitions on bank activities 
8across and within states during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century 
(Calomiris, 2000: 68). 
While farmers dominated the political and economic landscape of the nation, 
cleavages did exist between different regions. Regional groupings included southern 
plantation owners and slaveholders versus smaller northwestern farmers versus a small 
but growing industrialist population in the northeast. The nature of their economic 
activity led to preferences for different banking structures. In the South, wealthy 
slaveholders favored branching since the dominant form of collateral in the antebellum 
period was slaves rather than land (Kilbourne, 1995); there was little advantage from 
bonding the banker to a particular locale, as other non-slaveholding farmers would prefer. 
In the antebellum Northeast, branching restrictions were not an important constraint on 
the dominant economic class -- merchants and industrialists – since they benefited by the 
creation of charter rents to the extent that they could use their control of banks to improve 
their own costs of credit. In the Northwest, the middle-class farmer would carry the day 
with variations on location-specific banks (unit banks). In the mutual-guaranty systems of 
Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa (where banks joined a small cooperative network that offered 
mutual protection, self-regulation, and enforcement), farmers received many of the 
benefits of branching (particularly lower interest rates and lower risks of bank failure), 
while retaining the advantages of location-specific bank capital. Other banking systems 
of the Northwest opted simply for unit free banks (anyone willing to abide by a common 
set of state regulations could open a unit bank); none authorized free entry in the form of 
branch banks (Calomiris, 2000).
9The pro-unit banking agricultural states of the northwest tended to dominate the 
congressional committees that controlled banking regulation. They accomplished this via 
congressional ‘horse-trading’ over committee appointments (Calomiris, 2000: 68-69). 
Since the northeast was the region for which competition for seats would have occurred 
(between the south and the northwest), northwestern representatives won out as 
representatives from the northeast preferred to trade their seats to members who also 
opposed slavery. And once slavery was abolished, unit banking gained further political 
support from southern farmers.
In sum, the early US financial system displayed the key attributes of an agrarian-
oriented CME. Relationships dominated the organization of economic activity, with 
political institutions amplifying the political power of local farmers. As a result, 
regulatory power over the American financial system was largely determined at the state 
(local) level, with wide-ranging financial system implications, including the 
fragmentation of the banking system, and the eventual diffusion of corporate ownership 
in the twentieth century (Roe, 1994).
Farmers and Capital Share Power: Twentieth Century United States
Twentieth century American capitalism is largely the result of a battle between local 
interests favoring fragmentation against those seeking to make financial institutions, and 
markets, centralized. As Calomiris (2000) explains, tension increased in the late 
nineteenth century with the second industrialization wave. Political pressure to alter the 
financial system mounted with the growth of railroads and industry, and the attempts to 
reap advantages from scale and scope economies (Chandler, 1977). Indeed, many of the 
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US’s modern financial institutions trace their origins, or important formative moments, to 
events in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. But the political battles fought at 
this time illustrate the entrenched power of local interests - particularly farmers - who 
could prevent substantial changes to the status quo.
Roe (1994) offers an excellent historical account of how politics affected the 
evolution of the US financial system. He focuses on how populist interests, in 
combination with the US’s federal political institutions, led to the fragmentation of a 
burgeoning, centralized banking (and broader financial) system in the early twentieth 
century. Securities markets later developed as a way to circumvent the inefficient and 
fragmented banking system in order to provide much needed financing to America’s 
large industrial enterprises. But, as DeLong and Becht (2005) point out, Roe’s argument 
has “two holes.” First, Roe has a hard time answering why ‘politics’ was so strong in 
corporate finance, yet weaker in labor-management relations. Second, Roe’s argument 
has difficulty explaining why pyramids did not emerge in the United States, as they did in 
other countries. But both of the ‘holes’ in Roe’s argument are likely due to combining 
farmers and labor into one general ‘populist’ category. This term is frequently used to 
refer to those with low incomes, but this is problematic since farmers and labor can have 
widely divergent preferences.
For example, in the May 1932 edition of the American Federationist, published 
by the American Federation of Labor, William Green, the magazine’s editor, remarks 
that, “In the April [issue] were published a number of articles written by persons with 
special competence in the field of banking. … From these articles one conclusion stands 
out conspicuously: The need of a unified banking system.” He goes on to say:
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There are about 20,000 banks in the United States chartered as state banks 
or national banks. … In practice this amounts to 49 different banking 
systems, as each state fixes the amount of capitalization and practices 
required by all chartered…. Obviously, the first step toward raising 
general banking practices is to establish the authority of the Federal 
Government – then unified authority will close the escapes that have 
enabled banks to evade higher standards. The great preponderance of 
failures have come from state banks in rural communities. … To meet the 
problems of the small banks, a system of branch banks is proposed. 
Green reiterates these points and emphasizes the preference for small country banks to 
become branches of large, city banks in the April 1933 issue.i
Owners of capital were on the side of labor with respect to wanting more 
centralized banks. According to an editorial in the Wall Street Journal (December 13, 
1932), entitled “Too Many Banks,” “A reasonable and guarded expansion of branch 
banking will go far to overcome the conditions which a mushroom spread of little 
isolated banks has left behind it.” It was clear to owners and managers of large American 
enterprises that financing costs would be lowered with large, universal banks that could 
meet all their financing needs, as in Germany. As Calomiris (2000: 265) explains, “the 
statistical comparison of German and American financial systems confirms qualitative 
historical and theoretical analysis that has linked universal banking to low costs of 
industrial finance.” 
12
In contrast to labor and capital, farmers and unit banks wanted to keep banks 
fragmented and local. Because of the massive bank failures of the 1930s, the unit 
bankers’ lobby was considerably weakened. As a result, farmers’ political influence 
became critical to the preservation of local banking. Farmers’ success at preserving a 
fragmented banking system depended upon their capacity to lobby politicians; states with 
a greater abundance of wealthy farmers more effectively blocked new bank branching 
than those with poorer farmers (Calomiris, 2000). While specific types of farming led to 
variations in the support for branched versus unit banks, generally speaking, farmers 
tended to favor local banks over branched city banks. 
Three laws of great importance to the structure of the American financial system 
in the twentieth century illustrate farmers’ importance: the McFadden Act of 1927, the 
Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Together, 
they have had considerable influence on the structure of the American banking system 
and corporate finance (and equities markets) in the twentieth century.
The McFadden Act sought to give national banks competitive equality with state-
chartered banks by letting national banks branch within the state to the extent permitted 
by state law.ii This would be the first legislation to allow national banks to open branches 
within a state, and thus be a precedent-setting law of potentially great importance. Those 
who would benefit from this law include the large city banks, owners of large enterprises, 
and their employees. Farmers and the small unit banks who served their financing needs 
would be expected to oppose the legislation as it could lead to the draining away of 
money from the interior to urban, industrial centers. 
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The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 sought to separate the activities of 
commercial banks and securities firms and prohibit commercial banks from owning 
brokerages. It would also introduce federal deposit insurance.iii Those who would benefit 
most were the farmers who depended on the services of local banks, while wealthy 
industrialists and those who worked in them would be the losers as a result of 
inefficiencies in the banking system leading to a lower supply of lending and higher costs 
(both explicit via the lower supply, and implicit via the moral hazard cost of providing 
deposit insurance).  
Another critical piece of legislation that would have decades-long consequences 
for the structure of the American financial system was the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. One of its key features was the protection of minority shareholders in the 
secondary market. While the 1933 Securities Exchange Act, which dealt with the issuing 
of securities in the primary market, contained an antifraud provision, questions remained 
about its reach. The 1934 Act broadened the scope, and thereafter it was commonly 
invoked for insider trading cases; it has also been used against companies for price fixing 
(artificially inflating or depressing stock prices through stock manipulation), bogus 
company sales to increase stock price, and even a company's failure to communicate 
relevant information to investors. The main losers from this legislation were those with 
access to private information – wealthy owners and investors – and those who worked for 
them while those who supported it were those who sought to limit the scope and power of 
large financial institutions and corporations, notably farmers. 
For the tests conducted here, the dependent variable is the legislator’s ‘yea’ vote 
for a bill (coded as 1 or 0 otherwise).iv As a basic measure of the importance of farmers in 
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each state, I use the total value of agricultural production as a fraction of state income.v
Workers’ influence is measured by the proportion of a state’s total population that works 
in the manufacturing sector. Capital’s influence is measured by the level of 
manufacturing value added minus total wages as a fraction of the state’s total income. I 
also identify members as Democrat or Republican, a common identifier for voting 
patterns on financial legislation, and consistent with partisanship measures used in cross-
country tests (e.g., Roe, 2003). Table 1 presents the results from probit estimations for 
House and Senate votes on these three pieces of legislation.
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Table 1: Interests and US Financial Legislation
DV: Yes vote for the 
McFadden Act, 1927
DV: Yes vote for the 
Glass-Steagall Banking 
Act, 1933
DV: Yes vote for the 
Securities Exchange Act, 
1934
House Senate House Senate House Senate
Value of Farm 
Production
-0.02***
(-4.03)
-0.03***
(-4.05)
0.02***
(4.82)
-0.01*
(-1.8)
0.03***
(6.77)
0.02***
(2.72)
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.2 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.07
1
N 365 93 428 86 428 94
Manufacturing 
Population
0.04***
(3.28)
0.07**
(2.24)
-0.07***
(-5.52)
0.02
(0.92)
-0.12***
(-7.64)
-0.08***
(-2.88)
Pseudo-R2 0.025 0.05 0.05 0 0.11 0.07
2
N 365 93 427 86 428 94
Capital Value 
Added
0.003
(0.51)
0.05***
(2.82)
-0.01**
(-2)
0.009
(0.68)
-0.03***
(-4.63)
-0.01
(-1.04)
Pseudo-R2 0 0.09 0.006 0 0.039 0
3
N 365 93 428 86 428 94
Value of Farm 
Production
-0.02***
(-3.3)
-0.06***
(-3.69)
0.01*
(1.82)
-0.02*
(-1.72)
0.01**
(1.88)
0.03**
(2.19)
Manufacturing 
Population
-0.01
(-0.58)
-0.17**
(-2.44)
0.003
(0.12)
-0.03
(-0.63)
-0.02
(-0.61)
-0.1
(-0.27)
Capital Value 
Added
-0.02**
(-2.02)
0.02
(1.16)
0.005
(0.56)
-0.004
(-0.22)
-0.009
(-0.89)
0.03
(1.46)
Democrat -0.51***
(-2.97)
-0.62*
(-1.7)
2.08***
(9.88)
-0.1
(-0.34)
1.6***
(9.44)
0.97***
(2.92)
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.28 0.3 0.03 0.29 0.16
N 363 93 418 86 427 94
4
Log-
Likelihood
-200.84 -36.67 -200.6 -57 -194.43 -51.13
z-statistics are shown in parentheses.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; * 
statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Models 1 through 3 illustrate the specific relationship between the three variables 
(farmers, labor, and capital) and the votes cast to illustrate that divisions occurred in the 
expected way: representatives from farming states voted differently from their 
counterparts in worker and capital dominant states in each case. Model 4 illustrates that 
farmers’ influence remained robust to the inclusion of party identification; that is, 
members of congress would frequently break ranks with their party to vote the way their 
farming constituency would prefer (even exercising more influence on how members 
voted than party identification in the case of the McFadden Act!). And farmers exerted 
more influence in this regard than workers or capital. Indeed, the evidence is consistent 
with the view that farmers have exhibited considerable influence over the structure of 
America’s twentieth century financial system.
The key point is that labor (joined by capital) and farmers were at odds over the 
structure of the financial system, and should not be combined into a single ‘populist’ 
category. Clearly specifying these actors’ preferences, and accounting for their differing 
political power neatly fills Roe’s ‘two holes’ and remains consistent with his broader 
argument. The first ‘hole’ about politics being important to corporate finance, but not to 
labor-management relations is easily answered from this perspective. Farmers were 
politically powerful, and they favored fragmented, locally-oriented financial regulations. 
In other words, they wanted to prevent the emergence of large, city banks with branches 
in the interior that could drain money away and deny them a valuable form of insurance. 
Farmers care little about labor-management relations. And because labor has been 
politically weak in the United States, they were unable to affect labor-management 
relations, and have been unable to offer sufficient political support to large, city banks.
17
The second ‘hole’, about the failure of pyramids to emerge, is also consistent with 
distinguishing between politically powerful farmers, and politically weak labor. In other 
countries where labor is strong (e.g., Austria and France), pyramids do exist. Left-wing 
parties (and their labor union counterparts) view them as useful for implementing labor-
oriented policies across a wide range of enterprises. But farmers would not benefit from 
such concentrated financial and economic might. Indeed, such arrangements would be to 
their detriment as such oligopolistic power would almost inevitably lead to funds being 
drained out of the interior and put to more ‘productive’ uses in urban areas (i.e., invested 
in projects with a higher return, particularly in a period of increasing industrialization), 
and raising their own costs of financing. At the same time, farmers were likewise 
concerned that the concentration of industry would lead to higher transportation and other 
business services costs for farmers, as large firms would take the best and cheapest 
resources, and charge customers (farmers) higher prices as a result of monopoly.
For example, in the early 1890s, railroads and industrial firms, usually owned by 
families or small groups of investors, suffered from price wars that cartels could not 
remedy, forcing them to integrate into groups. This wave of mergers and reorganizations 
was fueled by the economic collapse of 1893. Banks implemented these changes which 
contributed to their control over many railroads and industrials, via voting trusts or board 
representations. vi By 1912, 18 financial institutions sat on the boards of 134 corporations. 
Of these 18 institutions, five banks were dominant: J.P. Morgan & Co., First National 
Bank, National City Bank, Guaranty Trust Co., and Bankers’ Trust sat on the boards of 
64 financial institutions and 68 nonfinancial corporations. Together, these five banks 
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controlled industrial assets (on behalf of others) representing 56 percent of the country’s 
GNP (Simon, 1998).
 Bank concentration and the perception that banker-directors encouraged 
collusion generated widespread criticism. Farmers, small business, and local bankers 
were the main groups that opposed bankers and giant corporations. As a result of 
mounting political pressure, Rep. Arsène Pujo spearheaded a Congressional investigation 
on the concentration of power in Wall Street in 1912. The Pujo hearings succeeded in 
tarnishing bankers’ reputation and led to the Clayton Act in 1914 which clarified and 
supplemented the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 by prohibiting stock purchase mergers 
that resulted in reduced competition. The Clayton Act helped to counteract the 
concentration of ownership and economic power of big business and financiers; bankers 
in particular were targeted as the main culprits in fostering a financial/industrial 
oligopoly. But many felt it did not go far enough.
The stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent Depression renewed calls for 
political investigations of Wall Street and the banking industry. The Gray-Pecora 
Hearings, from 1932-34, brought to light many misdeeds of commercial bankers and led 
to the enactment of legislation that would further reduce the power of big bankers. 
Reformers were especially worried about possible conflicts of interest that a banker-
director may have, and on the fate of minority shareholders that were cow-towed by 
bankers and their voting trusts. As a result, the Securities Act and the Glass-Steagall 
Banking Act were passed in 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act was signed into law 
in 1934. Together, they weakened the big bankers and financiers and their control over 
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corporations, and cemented the emerging trend of fragmentation that would come to 
characterize the structure of the American financial system. 
As a result of weakening large financial institutions and improving protections for 
small investors, local interests – led predominantly by farmers - unwittingly created the 
conditions that would lead to a flourishing equities market as a way to circumvent the 
fragmented banking system, and place power over corporations into managers’ hands. 
Thus, while farmers and local interests may not have specifically targeted pyramids in 
their legislative initiatives, their push for fragmentation (first with the Clayton Act and 
later with legislation in the 1930s) sent a clear message that this type of ownership 
structure would be politically unacceptable.
Although the United States is regarded as a non-interventionist state, an important 
exception should be made in the case of agriculture. Saloutos (1974) observes, “Perhaps 
in no period of American history were the efforts of the federal government to resolve the 
almost unresolvable problems of the farm prosecuted with greater vigor and optimism 
than during the New Deal years. What administrators and politicians thought and did 
about the depressed state of the farmers more or less set the pace for policy making in the 
post-World War II decades ….” For example, farmers’ vast political influence enabled 
the creation of the Farm Credit Administration in 1933, which extended billions of 
dollars in loans to farmers and their business cooperatives. At the same time, the FCA 
improved the farm credit market through the leadership and competition it provided. 
Credit was made available at the lowest possible rate, enabling thousands of borrowers to 
obtain credit who would otherwise have lost their property through foreclosures. 
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According to Saloutos, “The New Deal … constituted the greatest innovative epoch in 
the history of American agriculture.” 
Thus, through their substantial influence over the structure of the banking system 
and of corporate finance, complemented by government intervention to the benefit of the 
agricultural sector, farmers have been instrumental in the development of modern 
American capitalism by forcing its centralizing features, in the form of its securities 
markets, to adapt within decentralizing pressures, with respect to its banking system (and 
other financial institutions; Roe, 1994) and the diffusion of corporate ownership.
Farmers and Labor Share Power: Post-WWII France
At the end of WWII, centralized state administration of agricultural financing was well 
established as a result of laws from 1940-43 permitting the state to use the Crédit 
Agricole’s financing capabilities for wartime use. Consequently, French farmers molded 
this centralized structure to their own ends as a result of the substantial increase in their 
political power compared to that which existed during the Third Republic; there was no 
longer a strong Senate to block their legislative initiatives. The ordinances of October 17,
1944 and October 20, 1945 sought to attract prisoners from during the war, or those 
deported and recently repatriated, to rural employ by offering favorable credit terms. The 
law of May 24, 1946 likewise targeted young people between the ages of 21 and 35, with 
subsidized loans. In 1946 there were 661 loans totaling 140 million Francs; by 1959 there 
were 168,000 loans totaling 914 billion Francs for these young rural workers (Henry and 
Regulier, 1986: 74). The total value of medium and long-term loans made by the Crédit 
Agricole grew from 630 million francs in 1950 to 13 billion francs in 1963.vii While the 
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extensive subsidies and favorable credit terms were necessary following the war to deal 
with food shortages, the continuance of these generous benefits beyond the immediate 
postwar shortages illustrates that other political motives were at play, such as preventing 
a decline in the rural population (Kuisel, 1981: 187). Indeed, French farmers have 
maintained considerable political influence during the post-WWII period for several 
reasons: (1) constituency size; (2) political mobilization; (3) neocorporatist influence; (4) 
overrepresentation; and (5) voter heterogeneity leading to the exercise of a critical swing 
vote. 
Even after many years of urbanization and economic modernization, farmers were 
the fourth largest occupational group in France in the early 1990s.viii But more important 
than the number of active farmers (the statistic usually cited) is the size of the broader 
agricultural community, which Hervieu (1992) calculated to be 17 percent of the 
electorate, including: active farmers, retired farmers, spouses of farmers, voting age 
children of farmers, and former farmers now in other occupations.ix In addition to these 
groups, rural residents have strong common interests with farmers since cutting farm 
subsidies, for example, would ‘trigger a perverse multiplier effect’ accelerating the 
exodus of rural merchants and thus impairing the quality of life. Firms making up the 
agribusiness (e.g., traders, storers, food processors) likewise have a huge stake in the fate 
of farmers.x
A second factor contributing to French farmers’ political power is the 
membership density of the farmers’ union – the FNSEA - which is more than twice as 
high as that of the labor unions (54.5% for the farmers’ union versus 23% for the labor 
unions).xi The nature of farming issues bolsters reliance on the FNSEA since, as the 
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owner of his own business, a farmer must deal with a wide range of service needs which 
require organizational assistance. And because many farmers possess relatively low 
levels of education and income, and work in isolated settings, the FNSEA acts as a useful 
guide through the maze of regulations related to farming as well as providing access to 
financial resources through its close relationship to cooperatives and semipublic 
organizations, such as the French Chambers of Commerce (Keeler, 1996: 135). 
Additionally, in recent years the farmers’ union has effectively elicited public support by 
appealing to concerns over the environment and farmers’ role as custodians of the rural 
areas as well as protecting consumers against the potential risks of genetically modified 
crops from America.
A third factor contributing to French farmers’ unusually strong political influence 
is the state’s need for collaboration with an interest group in the agricultural area; no 
other economic domain features such numerous, small, and inaccessible production units. 
Consequently, state officials are highly dependent on their interest group clients for 
information on which to base policy and for staff assistance at the local level to assure the 
effective implementation of complex programs. Thus, France has developed 
neocorporatist group-state relations in which the agricultural ministry grants official 
recognition to the FNSEA and provides it with exclusive access to state decision makers 
at the national level, devolves power for the administration of certain policies at the 
subnational level, and offers special subsidies designed to facilitate the FNSEA’s 
performance of its quasi-official roles. In short, the FNSEA does not simply ‘lobby’ state 
officials, but instead tends to ‘comanage’ the affairs of the sector (Keeler, 1987: 6-16, 
256-59).
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Farmers also have a disproportionate chance to be elected officials and are 
overrepresented in many elections. France has more local administrative districts (36,487 
communes) and thus more sparsely populated rural districts than any other European 
state. Since members of the French senate are indirectly elected by an electoral college in 
which 95.5 percent of the votes are cast by members of the communes’ municipal 
councils, it is not surprising that farmers are overrepresented in the national upper house 
as well.xii Farmers are also overrepresented, albeit to a lesser degree, in the departmental 
general councils (Keeler, 1996).xiii
Although the number of farmers elected to these various representative positions 
has declined over the years, as one would expect, it is important to note that the degree of 
their overrepresentation has in fact increased. For example, the percentage of farmers in 
the senate has declined from 24.8 percent in 1959 to the current 14.3 percent, but the ratio 
of representation (the percentage of senators who are farmers divided by the percentage 
of farmers in the active population) has increased in that time from 1.2 to 2.0 (Keeler, 
1996). 
Finally, in comparison to Germany, French farmers are considerably more diverse 
socioeconomically. The spread between farm sizes and types is much larger in France 
than in Germany. During much of the post-war period, German farms have tended to be 
small and medium-sized and heavily capitalized. French farms display a wide range of 
farm types, ranging from modern farms in the northern plains to backward farms in 
mountainous regions barely permitting their sharecropper operators to live on a 
subsistence level (Averyt, 1977: 38). And with the exception of a lower Communist vote 
and a higher centrist vote, French farmers’ voting patterns have generally resembled 
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those of the rest of the electorate (Averyt, 1977: 24). This allows them to use a critical 
swing vote during elections, which political parties pay handsomely to court. 
As a result of these numerous ways of preserving their political influence, farmers 
have benefited from financial policies and government intervention catering to 
agriculture. Between 1950 and 1963, Crédit Agricole medium and long-term loans rose 
from 630 million francs to 13, 000 million francs.xiv This expansion has continued as the 
bank has financed, with considerable government subsidy, the technical and 
infrastructural modernization of the countryside. Figure 1 illustrates the tremendous 
increase in government assistance to the Crédit Agricole during the postwar period in 
comparison to the pre-war era, corresponding to their elevated political influence 
following the war.
Figure 1: Value of Advances from the State to the Crédit Agricole (1923-1972)
in millions of Francs (logarithmic scale)
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Government assistance continued to increase until the early 60s when the pro-
business Gaullist government took power. Despite the leveling off in government 
support, Crédit Agricole loans continued to grow. Additionally, the balance of deposits 
increased tremendously after the war as a result of a rapid expansion of its branches and 
favorable deposit rates. By 1959, the deposits of the Crédit Agricole represented about 
11.2% of total deposits in the French banking system. Comparing this to its deposit base 
in the prewar era illustrates the enormous change. 
Table 2: Composition of Deposits in France (in millions of contemporary francs)
Total Deposits (1) Crédit Agricole (2) (2)/(1)
1913 18581 4 0.0002%
1920 64249 27 0.0004%
1930 156705 999 0.006%
1937 180105 1297 0.007%
1959 11.2%
1975 1246.5 (billion FF) 147.9 (billion FF) 11.9%
Source: Gueslin (1992); for 1975: Bayliss and Butt Philip (1980: 127). 
While the Crédit Agricole has expanded its services, its core business has 
remained the agricultural sector.xv Indeed, the Crédit Agricole has considerably increased 
its services to farmers in comparison with the prewar period, corresponding to farmers’ 
far greater political power (Carré, Dubois, and Malinvaud 1975: 337). This expansion of 
the government’s role in agricultural financing was accompanied by the government’s 
increased role in the ownership and distribution of funds through state-owned 
commercial banks. Farmers’ support for nationalizing the commercial banks after WWII 
and for government intervention created heavy reliance on state institutions for the 
administration of the economy. While farmers may not have been directly involved in 
deciding the distribution of lending to industrial enterprises from these state-owned 
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banks, they were supportive of the state’s capacity to administer funds (since they 
benefited from funds being redirected to agriculture). This created an overreliance on the 
state to manage the economy, with wide-ranging implications (Hall, 1986; Culpepper et 
al, 2006). For example, the prominent role the state played in coordinating arrangements 
between employers and unions left them vulnerable to the ‘move to the market’ of the 
1980s, which saw the decline of state intervention across Europe. As a result, firms and 
workers found themselves without the support for strategic coordination on which they 
once counted, and institutional change has been more dramatic in France than in the 
liberal or coordinated market economies of northern Europe (Hall and Thelen, 2005). 
Thus, farmers have been important to supporting the establishment of France’s 
post-WWII banking-oriented economy with extensive government intervention, which 
has had wide-ranging implications that extend beyond the agricultural sector. 
Labor-Capital-Farmer Power-Sharing Coalition: Post-WWII Japan
While French farmers’ influence was generally overshadowed by labor, Japanese farmers 
have been more important to the state’s interventionist tendencies since labor has been 
weaker here. Japan’s farmers have been politically powerful as a result of: (1) land 
reform; (2) changes to the legislative-executive balance; (3) malapportionment; (4) the 
electoral system; and (5) consensus political institutions. 
Immediately after the war, land reform measures were introduced by SCAP 
officials, who feared that the revival of the tenancy system could lead to a relapse of 
authoritarianism or a communist insurgency among landless farmers. SCAP also viewed 
land reforms as critical to the democratization effort and so a dramatic restructuring of 
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landholdings in rural Japan ensued.xvi At the end of the war, tenants cultivated 45 percent 
of arable land; by 1950, tenants cultivated only 10 percent. Likewise, the number of farm 
families that owned 90 percent or more of their land increased from 1.7 million to 3.8 
million.xvii Land redistribution vaulted farmers to a very politically powerful position, 
comprising nearly half of the total electorate in 1950 (Mulgan, 2001: 304). With such an 
overwhelming proportion of the electorate, agricultural interests had sufficient power to 
elect Diet members outright and to propose and pass legislation. And although the rural 
population has declined since then, agriculture has retained considerable negative 
political power (i.e., the ability to ensure electoral failure if votes are redirected away 
from a candidate and to veto unfavorable policies), which has been sustained by 
increasing malapportionment of electoral districts begun with the 1947 electoral law 
(Wada, 1996: 11). Table 3 illustrates the increasing malapportionment in both houses 
during the postwar period.
Table 3: Differences between voting values in the least and most densely populated 
electorates (1947-90)
Ratio in House of Councillors 
prefectural constituencies
Ratio in House of 
Representatives constituencies
Year
Least densely 
populated 
constituency
Most densely 
populated 
constituency
Lease densely 
populated 
constituency
Most densely 
populated 
constituency
1947 1.25 :       1 1.51 :       1
1950 1.55 :       1 2.17 :       1
1960 2.39 :       1 3.21 :       1
1967 5.07 :       1
1970 4.83 :       1
1980 5.37 :       1 3.95 :       1
1990 6.25 :       1 3.38 :       1
1998 4.98 :       1 2.40 :       1
   Source: Mulgan, 2001: 330.
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Multi-member district single-nontransferable vote rules have magnified the 
political power of farmers. This type of electoral system creates incentives for politicians 
to develop a loyal group of supporters by wooing them with pork in exchange for votes. 
Politicians offer favors via government regulations and through the bureaucracy (e.g., 
Fukui and Fukai, 1996). “The party in control of the government has, of course, a distinct 
advantage in creating personal vote coalitions for its candidates because it monopolizes 
policy and budgetary favors. As long as the majority party can pass its legislation through 
the parliament and can direct bureaucrats effectively, it can enact (or have bureaucrats 
implement) particularistic policies that facilitate the creation and maintenance of personal 
vote coalitions” (Cowhey and McCubbins, 1995: 44). Some of these particularistic 
policies may include subsidized lending and other forms of financial assistance. To direct 
these financing favors to specific recipients, intermediaries are relied upon. In Japan, 
farmers have benefited considerably as key members of these personal vote coalitions, 
and the close links between farmers and LDP politicians has contributed to LDP majority 
control in the post-war period.
Additionally, the legislative-executive balance changed after the war, placing the 
locus of political power firmly in the lower house of the Diet to the benefit of farmers. 
And Japan’s consensus political system has made it difficult to change the financial 
institutions because of the numerous veto-points that preserve the status quo. 
Added to these institutional mechanisms was the reform of the cooperatives, 
which enabled farmers to organize and become highly influential in electing 
representatives to government. During the war, cooperatives were part of the Imperial 
Agricultural Association (IAA). As an instrument of government control over agriculture 
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during the war, the IAA was tainted by authoritarianism in the eyes of SCAP officials, 
and in 1947 Occupation authorities ordered its dissolution. Under the Agricultural 
Cooperative Association Law (or Nokyo Law) passed in December 1947, local 
cooperatives were reconstituted as a private, voluntary organization — the Nokyo. As a 
result of their new legal status, the number of local Nokyo proliferated rapidly – from 
4,256 in April 1948 to 27,819 by December 1948.xviii
The Nokyo Law allowed agricultural cooperatives to take deposits and to lend 
funds via the Norinchukin Bank - Nokyo’s banking arm. Nokyo were also permitted to 
supply credit to local public organizations, banks, or other banking institutions.xix
Consequently, Nokyo garnered tremendous political and economic power at the local 
level. Additionally, the cooperative banks collected government payments destined for 
producers. These government transfers, in turn, fueled the expansion of cooperative 
activities in other areas. According to a 1951 SCAP publication, “In most villages, 
general-purpose cooperatives now provide the primary credit, marketing, purchasing, 
processing, and other essential services used by farmers.”xx The framework for offering 
agricultural subsidies through cooperatives was established under the Land Improvement 
Law of 1949 and through the Law for the Reconstruction of Agricultural Finances in 
1951. During the 1949-53 period, subsidies more than tripled, bolstering the reliance on 
agricultural cooperatives as politically useful intermediaries.xxi
The political instability of the 1945-1950 period offered the agricultural 
cooperatives a golden opportunity to establish themselves as a potent political force at the 
‘rice’ roots level. With 90 percent of all farm households represented by at least one 
cooperative member, Nokyo became the most important organization in rural Japan.xxii
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There were frequent instances in which the position taken by Nokyo determined the 
success or failure of a given candidate. Furthermore, Nokyo executives made use of their 
vote-gathering capacities to enter and win national and local elections.xxiii  In short, 
cooperatives became an essential component of every rural politician’s reelection 
constituency, and considerably enhanced credit availability to small farmers (Mulgan, 
2000).
In order to receive the political support of the local cooperative, however, 
politicians had to distinguish themselves as advocates of agricultural interests. The surest 
way to secure the endorsement of Nokyo officials was through government largesse. 
Funds for paddy reconstruction, irrigation, and other pork-barrel projects carried out 
through the local cooperative were critical for rural political success.  Between 1949 and 
1953, agricultural expenditures increased from 5.9 to 16.6 percent of the national budget; 
direct subsidies and grants accounted for 50 percent of the Ministry of Agriculture 
budget. And in 1953, agricultural interest successfully lobbied to prevent the diversion of 
funds toward interest rate subsidies for industry with the Trust Fund Bureau Law, which 
set a floor of 6.05 percent on the lending rate of Trust Fund Bureau loans to government 
financial institutions, except in specially authorized circumstances (Sheingate, 2001; 
Calder, 1990).xxiv
The massive growth of rural subsidies was partly due to party competition for 
farmers’ votes since they comprised nearly half the electorate. Conservative politicians 
outdistanced their Socialist rivals at channeling government resources to rural Japan, 
which ballooned as a result of the Korean War (1950-1953). A 1952 opinion poll 
reported that 77 percent of farmers favored the two conservative parties over their 
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socialist rivals. By the time the various postwar parties combined in 1955 into the Liberal 
Democratic Party on the Right and Japan Socialist Party on the Left, the cooperative 
associations were a central part of the conservatives’ electoral strategy and a main reason 
for subsequent LDP political success. As the LDP-Nokyo alliance solidified over the next 
decade, subsidies for local public works projects rose steadily (Sheingate, 2001). 
But farmers have been important to solidifying corporations’ reliance on patient 
financing as well. The early concentration of government-directed investment in heavy 
industry gave the post-war banking-dominated system a substantial boost. The 
Reconstruction Bank played a crucial role in this regard, and in 1948 it had become by 
far the largest supplier of capital for the coal, iron and steel, fertilizer, electric, shipping, 
and textile industries (Yamamura 1967: 27-8). However, it was disbanded in January 
1952 because of its inflationary consequences - it raised funds largely through bond 
issues monetized by the Bank of Japan. Consequently, government officials moved to the 
use of postal savings to fund government-targeted industries via the Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Program (FILP), which was finally consolidated in 1953.  The Japan 
Development Bank, as an entity within the FILP, replaced the functions of the 
Reconstruction Bank in 1951, and devoted 84% of its total loans to the coal, iron/steel, 
electricity, and shipbuilding industries in the years 1951-55 (Broadbridge 1966: 32-3).  
Thus, the early concentration of investment in these sectors, coupled with the powerful 
position of the city banks, produced an industrial and financial pattern which led to close 
linkages between firms and banks (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). 
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Figure 2: The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program
(Based on Fiscal 1989 Data)
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Government intervention was bolstered by the postal savings bank, which offered 
very attractive deposit account treatment and which catered to those living in the 
countryside because of its numerous branches. Postal savings have succeeded as a result 
of government support in four areas: licensing of new financial products, tax treatment, 
administrative cost support, and the expansion of post-office branches. The attractiveness 
of the financial products it offers has been important to its rapid expansion. One highly 
attractive product is the ten-year fixed-interest deposit without penalty for early 
withdrawal. These deposits have few analogues either in the Japanese financial system or 
elsewhere. They carry comparatively high interest rates for Japanese financial 
instruments and can serve as collateral for housing and other loans (it is possible to 
temporarily withdraw the bulk of the principal without impairing the high, long-term 
guaranteed-interest of the account). Second, until 1988, postal savings accounts were tax 
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exempt, although there was a ceiling on permissible deposits. However, there has been 
little effective control over the proliferation of multiple accounts. Third, the postal 
savings system in Japan also benefits by having its operating costs subsidized from the 
interest income flowing from Trust Fund Bureau lending. Finally, the network of post 
offices across Japan has proliferated rapidly during the post-war era, with over 23,000 
branches by the mid-1980s, orders of magnitude greater than those of even the largest 
banks, which were constrained by Ministry of Finance restrictions from expanding as 
rapidly. The Dai Ichi Kangyō Bank, Japan’s largest, had, for example, only 379 branches 
in late 1988. Internationally, Citibank had 2,900 branches while France’s huge Crédit 
Agricole had 10,620. 
Commercial banks have received far fewer benefits than the postal savings 
system; even the concessions they received came with a discriminatory time lag during 
which the postal savings system was able to gain market share at the expense of the 
banks. For example, although postal savings were accorded tax-free status in the early 
postwar period, banks did not receive this for even a portion of their deposits until 1952. 
In addition, the private banks have never been allowed to offer financial products as 
attractive as postal savings bank deposits or to freely develop the sort of huge national 
branch network that postal savings enjoys (Calder, 1990).
The contemporary importance of the postal savings bank can be seen by the size 
of its total deposit base, as shown in table 4. In addition to its importance within Japan, it 
has also remained the largest financial institution in the world for over two decades.
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Table 4: The Rapid Postwar Growth of Postal Savings Deposits in Japan
(in ¥ trillion)
Year Postal Savings 
Deposits
 Bank Deposits1
1955 0.5 3.7
1965 2.7 20.7
1975 24.6 92.9
1985 103 230.6
2005 234 835.7
   Note: 1. Figures for bank deposits include totals for 
   city, local, trust, and long-term credit banks.
   Source: Calder, 1990: 43.
Thus, farmers have contributed significantly to sustaining the institutions and 
policies of Japan’s coordinated market economy with favorable deposit rates, and other 
perquisites, via the postal savings banks. This led to a high accumulation of funds for the 
government, which were to used to finance industry, and saved these firms from turning 
to securities markets and diluting their ownership. This helped Japanese firms build and
sustain their intercorporate ownership structures (and which contributed to managerial 
power). Thus, through their important role in the creation of the FILP, and the policies of 
the postal savings bank, farmers have contributed to Japanese firms’ reliance on patient 
capital. And insofar as Roe (2003) finds that long-term financing arose as a complement 
to employment stability, but not necessarily as a result of labor’s bargaining power, 
farmers may fill the causal void through their creation of various intermediation channels 
that fostered patient lending arrangements. Because financial institutions tend to 
complement one another, once these long-term financing mechanisms were in place, they 
reinforced this long-term orientation in the broader financial system. Indeed, farmers 
have played an important complementary role to labor. Farmers have created mechanisms 
external to the firm that preserve a reliance on bank lending; Japan’s financial system, 
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and the forces that preserve it, cannot be properly understood without considering 
farmers’ important role At the same time, farmers sharing power with capital is consistent 
with the managerial control in the US. While it was initially the result of Occupation 
policies to break up the zaibatsu, that they reformed and stabilized as keiretsu with 
intercorporate ownership rather than as pyramids is consistent with what one might 
expect from the perspective of American financial history.
IV) Conclusions
Identifying the key players is critical. While most discussions about contemporary
capitalism focus on workers, managers, and owners, (and the different firms in which 
they are found), these studies often do not consider the origins of these institutions. 
Considering the substantial influence of institutional inertia on modern outcomes, it is 
necessary to examine the origins, and to consider which actors were most important in 
the early construction of capitalist systems. In this regard, farmers have played a critical 
role. Although they may now lack the power to exert changes to the institutions of 
contemporary capitalism, their influence is felt most strongly through the legacy of the 
institutions they were instrumental in creating, and by retaining the power to block 
changes to it. 
In France following World War II, farmers offered political support for the 
increased level of government intervention in the financial system, and helped to create 
and support the expansion of what was to become one of the world’s largest banks – the 
Crédit Agricole. In the US, farmers’ political influence led to strong regulations 
protecting local banks and, through the US’s decentralized political system, they 
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contributed to the fragmentation of the American financial system. In Japan, farmers 
supported the postal savings bank, which became even larger than France’s behemoth 
Crédit Agricole, and which fed large amounts of money to the government which was 
then lent to industry (through the FILP) and thereby helped to foster a long-term 
financing orientation among Japanese firms. 
By considering the importance of farmers to capitalist outcomes among today’s 
wealthy economies, we can understand better the influence they have on developing 
countries. Indeed, many of today’s developing countries are just establishing their 
capitalist institutions. China and India, for example, are at a point in their development 
that resembles the process many wealthy countries went through at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. And in these countries, the rural population is very large, and 
potentially very powerful. In China, for example, leaders are particularly worried about 
inciting a farmers’ rebellion (as has occurred before in Chinese history) and so they must 
be sensitive to the effects that their policies have on their rural inhabitants. Thus, while 
understanding the role of farmers among today’s wealthy economies is important to 
explaining the varieties of capitalism observed among this select group, it is of potentially 
greater significance to understanding the potential development paths of industrializing 
nations.
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